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Airline Codeshare Alliances
Marketing Boon and Revenue Management Information
Systems Challenge
Codeshare alliances are a popular instrument for airlines to grow profitably. This paper
juxtaposes the challenges that they create for analytical information systems on the one
hand and their motivation from a marketing perspective on the other. In this regard,
revenue management systems as a central tool of the ticketing process are of particular
interest. Complementary codesharing reduces alliance-wide revenues by up to 1 %. Losses
disseminate over the whole network and increase with total demand and the degree of
codeshare demand. Virtual codesharing causes losses of up to 1.5 % depending on the
discount level offered by the marketing carrier and on the demand structure. Based on the
findings, recommendations for airline management and future research are derived.
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1 Introduction
As competitive pressure increases, merg-
ers and alliances are gaining popularity
across all industries. A large and growing
body of management research considers
the topic; compare for example Ireland et
al. (2002, pp. 413–446) for a discussion
of the role of management in corporate
alliances. At the same time, mergers and
alliances provide new opportunities for
information systems (IS) research: They
pose challenges to communication and
information consistency, and increase the
size and complexity of decision support
tasks, as discussed for example in Killing
(1988, pp. 55–67).
Many industries regard alliances as the
appropriate framework to build more ef-
ficient and profitable business networks.
Airline codeshare alliances are a typical
example. They enable carriers to coop-
erate when trade and ownership regula-
tions make other forms of cooperation
impossible (Park 1997, pp. 181–195). Ac-
cording to de la Torre (1999, pp. 60–
75), the five main benefits of airline al-
liances are greater network reach, ac-
cess to foreign markets, increased mar-
ket penetration, higher traffic volumes
and cost benefits due to synergy. From a
marketing perspective, these benefits lead
to potential gains through the extension
of the product portfolio, improved cus-
tomer relationship management, and the
establishment of common sales policies
across markets.
In 2010, the three large airline al-
liances – Star Alliance, One World and
Sky Team – accounted for 54 members
and a market share of almost 60 % of
revenue passenger kilometers (Jain 2011,
p. 24). Their popularity stems from the
low margins prevalent in the industry:
High competition and increasing costs
combined with price-sensitive customers
force airlines to collaborate with strategic
partners.
Codesharing enables airlines to jointly
market their capacity by assigning their
designators to a common flight. For ex-
ample, the Lufthansa flight LH430 from
Frankfurt to Chicago is also marketed by
United Airlines as flight UA8836, by Thai
Airways as flight TG7708, by Air Canada
(AC9457) and Air India (AI8637). While
Lufthansa operates the flight (operating
carrier), each codeshare partner may sell
seats on it (marketing carrier). By means
of this concept, the marketing carriers ex-
tend their product portfolio without re-
quiring extra resources; they feed addi-
tional passengers into their own network
and augment demand on major routes
(Vinod 2005, pp. 66–82). Moreover, they
can access new markets: In the example,
Thai offers a flight that neither departs
from nor arrives in its home market.
We collected data at Lufthansa Ger-
man Airlines indicating an increase in al-
liance capacity of about 42 % from 2001
to 2011. The data also reveal that more
than half of Lufthansa marketed flights
are operated by allied carriers. Similarly,
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the majority of Lufthansa operated flights
is marketed through at least one other
airline. Overall, codesharing accounts for
6–8 % of Lufthansa bookings and has
become a crucial factor in the airline’s
business strategy.
Alliances generate new challenges for
the airline planning process and the an-
alytical information systems supporting
it. These include the increased complex-
ity of the underlying decision support
problems as well as the exchange of in-
formation and the coordination of joint
decisions.
This paper contributes to information
systems and airline alliance research in
two ways: On the one hand, it provides a
structured description of marketing ben-
efits and information systems’ challenges.
On the other hand, the simulation re-
sults quantify the impact of decentralized
codeshare control, thereby prompting to
close the gap between theoretical research
and the current practical implementation
of alliance revenue management.
The rest of this article is organized as
follows. We begin with an extensive liter-
ature review in Sects. 2 and 3. We con-
sider the benefits of airline codeshare al-
liances as a marketing tool and cluster
relevant literature accordingly. Following
this overview, we outline the airline plan-
ning process under the aspect of im-
plementing codeshare alliances. Subse-
quently, we critically consider the result-
ing challenges for analytical information
systems. After introducing the simulation
approach in Sect. 4, we use it to estimate
the cost of codesharing on revenue man-
agement and to derive benchmarks for
the performance of codeshare alliances
in Sect. 5. The paper closes with a sum-
mary of the findings and recommenda-
tions toward further application oriented
research.
2 Marketing Promises of Airline
Codeshare Alliances
From a marketing perspective, three ma-
jor promises render airline codeshare al-
liances attractive: synergy in customer re-
lationship management, the extension of
the product portfolio, and the establish-
ment of common sales policies.
2.1 Customer Relationship Management
In airline alliances, cost efficient cus-
tomer relationship management can be
realized through infrastructure synergy
and improved resource utilization. Ex-
amples for potentially shared resources
are gates, lounges, and check-in facilities.
Synergy arises by pooling ground and
maintenance operations as well as pur-
chasing and marketing activities (Mor-
rish and Hamilton 2002, pp. 401–407).
Sharing each other’s infrastructure also
improves the service quality: For exam-
ple, passengers obtain access to more
lounges than could be efficiently main-
tained by a single carrier, and shared
terminals reduce transfer times and dis-
tances between gates. Further quality as-
pects associated with alliances include
safety, reliability, professionalism, and on
board service. Along with a common logo
and slogan, these factors establish the al-
liance as a brand, foster its recognition,
and distinguish it from other airlines and
alliances.
Alliance members often merge
their frequent flyer programs, thereby
strengthening the ties between the al-
liance and its customers (de la Torre
1999, p. 79). Passengers can earn and re-
deem miles within the entire alliance net-
work; privileges of status customers, such
as lounge access, priority boarding and
late check-in, are globally recognized.
In addition to increased flight frequen-
cies and a wider variety of connections,
codesharing allows airlines to create
seamless travel opportunities (Brueckner
2001, pp. 1475–1498). Seamless travel
provides the impression of travelling on
a single airline and is supported by com-
mon market interfaces and joint schedul-
ing. The advantages of seamless travel
include single ticketing, check-in and
baggage drop-off.
2.2 Product Portfolio
Codeshare partners enrich their prod-
uct portfolio by selling tickets for each
other’s flights. Oum et al. (1996, pp. 187–
202) differentiate three types of codeshar-
ing: complementary, parallel, and virtual
codesharing. For a complementary code-
share, flights operated by two or more air-
lines are combined to form a new route
(Oum et al. 1996, pp. 187–202). In con-
trast, in a parallel codeshare each carrier
also operates the route individually. Vir-
tual codeshares refer to an airline offer-
ing a route while not operating any of the
flights involved.
Complementary codesharing is preva-
lent in international alliances where indi-
vidual networks rarely overlap: The main
objective is to extend network reach and
to access foreign markets. The airlines in
the example above are suited for com-
plementary codesharing as they have dis-
tinct home markets and only few shared
routes.
Parallel codeshares can mostly be
found in domestic markets. On the do-
mestic level, airline networks tend to
have more overlap: Partners focus on
increasing market penetration and aim
to reduce competition on jointly served
routes. In international alliances, paral-
lel codeshares typically occur on hub-
to-hub routes, i.e., Chicago–Frankfurt as
offered by United and Lufthansa.
Several authors use an economic per-
spective to demonstrate the effect of
complementary and parallel codeshar-
ing on prices, traffic volumes, and so-
cial welfare. Adler and Smilowitz (2007,
pp. 394–409), Brueckner and Whalen
(2000, pp. 503–545) and others find
that complementary codeshares posi-
tively affect prices, output and welfare.
For parallel codesharing, the same con-
tributions point out the prevalence of
anti-competitive effects as prices in-
crease while traffic volumes and welfare
decrease.
Last but not least, virtual codesharing
is predominantly a strategic marketing
tool, as the marketing carrier does not
supply capacity. Virtual codeshares occur
in domestic as well as international mar-
kets and are described in further detail
in Ito and Lee (2007, pp. 355–380) and
Gayle (2007, pp. 17–18).
2.3 Sales Policies
Possibly the most ambivalent benefit of
airline alliances is the potential to estab-
lish common sales policies. On the one
hand, alignments can provide depend-
able standards for customers, increasing
the perceived fairness of pricing and sim-
plifying the purchasing process. On the
other hand, they can easily catch the whiff
of price fixing and cartel building.
The feasible extent of sales policy co-
ordination depends on the alliance’s le-
gal situation. This may vary depending
on the formal background – if the coop-
eration legally is a merger but the part-
ners remain independent for organiza-
tional reasons, sales policy coordination
can reach as far as desired. If the coop-
eration consists of agreements between
economically separate and possibly com-
peting airlines, it is strictly regulated by
competition laws.
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Using their partners’ sales channels,
airlines can increase their visibility in
the global distribution systems (GDS).
GDS form the largest distribution chan-
nel (followed by carriers’ websites and
third party providers) and are accessed
by travel agencies (Boyd and Bilegan
2003, p. 1365). Higher visibility, for ex-
ample through preference display, in-
creases market penetration and purchase
probability (Boyd and Bilegan 2003,
pp. 1363–1386). Continuing the exam-
ple, Lufthansa flight LH430 also appears
as UA8836, TG7708, AC9457 and AI8637
in the GDS or on Internet travel sites,
turning a single service into five different
offers.
As another benefit, codeshare connec-
tions appear as online connections in the
GDS and therefore take a more promi-
nent position than genuine interline con-
nections (Bamberger et al. 2004, p. 198).
Similar to the display of search results on
the Internet, the higher an offer is ranked,
the more likely customers will choose it.
Furthermore, empirical research by Bam-
berger et al. (2004, pp. 195–222) has
shown that customers prefer online to in-
terline connections: One reason is com-
paratively lower prices, but brand loyalty
and perception of the marketing carrier
also play a role.
Finally, online connections are easier
to advertise: A carrier can independently
tailor and communicate the offer. It can
customize the tariffs as well as the mar-
keting process to fit its brand percep-
tion and home market. As a result, air-
lines share marketing costs while bene-
fitting from each other’s regional com-
petence and local market knowledge. Us-
ing their partners’ existing sales chan-
nels, they can construct more effective
and more efficient campaigns.
3 Airline Planning and Operations
Systems in Codeshare Alliances
For more than forty years, airline plan-
ning and operations have been supported
by analytical information systems. As de-
scribed in Smith et al. (2001, pp. 37–
55), this has allowed airlines to system-
atically include operations research prin-
ciples and to adopt electronic business
concepts early on. Alliance membership
introduces additional complications to
most information systems, and these are
in the focus of the second part of the
literature review presented in this section.
3.1 Alliance Impacts on Airline Planning
Systems
As described by Belobaba (2009, pp. 153–
181), the first part of the airline plan-
ning process includes fleet planning,
route planning, and schedule develop-
ment. The author refers to this as strate-
gic planning. The task of assigning prices
and allocating availabilities may be re-
garded as the second part and considered
to be of tactical nature.
The first step of strategic planning, fleet
planning, is generally not affected by al-
liances: While a homogeneous fleet might
be more cost efficient, individual strate-
gic factors take precedence. Alliance con-
siderations first arise during route plan-
ning and flight scheduling. Both are of-
ten based on economic and revenue fore-
casts. The existence of complementing or
parallel offers by alliance partners can
influence these, affecting the expected
performance on certain routes.
The development of flight schedules
is also supported by operations research
systems: Fleet assignment and aircraft ro-
tations are optimized according to given
conditions such as departure and ar-
rival slots, available aircrafts, technical
constraints and demand forecasts. Effi-
cient schedules with regard to connec-
tion times and fleet utilization are ham-
pered by codesharing complications. For
example, not just connections to flights
operated by the own airline, but also to
those constituting complementary code-
shares should be considered. On parallel
routes, partners could avoid direct com-
petition caused by wing-to-wing flights.
Demand forecasts that form the basis of
planning can be improved by including
codeshare demand.
The tactical steps of crew scheduling,
airport resource management and oper-
ations control are based on the results
of flight scheduling. Here, only minimal
considerations with regard to alliance
partners are required: At most, the access
to commonly used airport infrastruc-
ture such as lounges, gates or check-in
facilities needs to be coordinated.
Information exchange plays a crucial
role for the integration of codeshare al-
liances in the planning process. At least,
the partners’ plans with regard to routes
and schedules should be exchanged;
merged demand forecasts, however, will
provide the best possible coordination.
In the tactical stage of airline plan-
ning concerned with price and inventory
optimization, the role of information
exchange becomes increasingly impor-
tant. Whereas infrequent exchanges can
support strategic planning, information
about pricing and revenue management
should be as current as possible. As will
be shown in Sect. 3.2, alliance revenue
management (RM) ideally asks for com-
mon demand forecasts, common pricing
and consistent availability controls. As
such a close cooperation may not be de-
sired or admissible, the gap between the
theoretical alliance-wide optimum and
most practical implementations widens.
Finally, also the impact of alliances
on sales and distribution is considerable.
While GDS already enable codeshare of-
fers, the airlines must adapt their inter-
nal ticketing processes and possibly other
sales channels.
As shown in Fig. 1, pricing and RM are
among those steps of the planning pro-
cess where the impact of codeshare al-
liances is strongest: Either the partners
jointly exploit customers’ willingness-to-
pay or they underbid each other, accept-
ing profit setbacks through cannibaliza-
tion. In this area, the trade-off between
potential marketing benefits and chal-
lenges to IS design is especially promi-
nent. For this reason, our subsequent
analysis focuses on the challenges for
alliance revenue management systems.
3.2 Challenges for Alliance Revenue
Management Systems
From an information systems perspec-
tive, alliances create two main challenges
for airline planning. Both are most ap-
parent in revenue management, but also
apply to systems supporting the other
steps of the planning process.
Separate and Heterogeneous Systems
Most airlines operate complex and highly
customized RM systems to optimize their
individual performance. The market in-
terface for codeshare itineraries needs to
be managed across these separate sys-
tems. To exploit the full codesharing
potential, it is essential to include in-
formation on such itineraries in each
airline’s calculations and to implement
common control capabilities.
Incomplete Information As carriers
in international alliances typically re-
main independent entities, antitrust laws
restrict the exchange of information.
Therefore, not all information neces-
sary to optimally manage codeshare
itineraries is available to all partners. This
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Fig. 1 The airline planning
process and alliance
considerations
includes prices, demand forecasts and
product structures, and as far as possible
booking data. Due to the restrictions on
information exchange, potential benefits
from joint planning become difficult to
realize.
For the success and stability of an al-
liance it is crucial to overcome these chal-
lenges. With regard to RM, two cen-
tral questions emerge: First, what is the
most feasible way for alliance carriers to
exchange availability information across
their separate systems? And second, how
should airlines forecast demand and op-
timize codeshare itineraries with only
incomplete information?
Interviews with industry experts of
Lufthansa have revealed that availabil-
ity exchange is in practice mostly re-
stricted to availability status messages
(AVS). The operating carrier commu-
nicates local booking class availabilities
to the marketing carrier (Vinod 2005,
p. 69). The marketing carrier calculates
the minimum availabilities across all op-
erating carriers. A booking class becomes
available if and only if all operating
carriers offer it locally.
As flight level availabilities distort net-
work controls and tend to be more
restrictive (see Talluri and van Ryzin
2004, pp. 81–122), bid price sharing pro-
vides a network-based extension: Instead
of exchanging booking class availabili-
ties, the carriers exchange current bid
prices – the marginal value of the next
seat. Many carriers implementing net-
work revenue management already use
bid price controls and bid price shar-
ing has been shown to increase revenue
(Jain 2011, pp. 92–101). However, the
exchange of bid prices requires partial
antitrust immunity. Additionally, practi-
tioners report that nowadays bid price
sharing is rarely used in practice. There-
fore, the computational study presented
in this text implements AVS availabil-
ity exchange. For discussions of the two
methods refer to the contributions by
Boyd (1998, pp. 1–7) and Vinod (2005,
pp. 66–82).
Although some alliances have been
granted partial immunity, practitioners
further report no or little information ex-
change with regard to bookings and ex-
pected demand. While the marketing car-
rier knows the exact bookings and avail-
abilities, the operating carriers may not
be able to distinguish codeshare book-
ings from local bookings. This lack of
information prevents airlines from ex-
plicitly forecasting and optimizing code-
share itineraries. Instead, they are fore-
casted and optimized together with local
bookings.
Finally, the information asymmetry be-
tween operating and marketing carrier
creates a moral hazard: The marketing
carrier may use the additional informa-
tion to independently maximize its rev-
enue at the cost of its partners. However,
this inequality balances out as all oper-
ating carriers usually offer a codeshare
route.
3.3 Related Research on Airline Alliances
Having discussed the marketing benefits
of codeshare alliances as well as their im-
pact on information systems, let us also
mention that there is a growing body of
related research devoted to other aspects
of airline alliances. As this paper focuses
on the implications of current codeshare
techniques applied in practice, this sec-
tion provides only a brief overview of this
literature.
Abdelghany et al. (2009, pp. 307–330)
discuss the selection of codeshare flights
in a hypothetical alliance network as
one aspect of alliance formation. Their
model explicitly considers the tradeoff
between additional codeshare passengers
and displaced local demand, but does not
incorporate seat allocation decisions.
De la Torre (1999, pp. 1–215) provides
a general introduction to codesharing
and also highlights its impact on the rev-
enue management process. Darot (2001,
pp. 1–168), and more recently Jain (2011,
pp. 1–142), present two large-scale sim-
ulation studies that evaluate the effect of
various codeshare control approaches on
alliance performance and traffic mix.
Wright et al. (2010, pp. 15–37), To-
paloglu (2012, pp. 500–517) and Hu et
al. (2013, pp. 1–38) provide a more the-
oretical perspective on alliance revenue
management. Topaloglu proposes an im-
provement to decentralized codeshare
availability control. The other papers fo-
cus on revenue sharing – the process of
distributing codeshare revenues among
the participating carriers – and demon-
strate its impact on availability decisions.
Wright et al. compare several static and
dynamic schemes in terms of alliance rev-
enues; Hu et al. develop a static scheme
that implements the central solution in
the local systems of the alliance partners.
Although this research proposes inter-
esting enhancements to the codeshare
process, most suggestions are not directly
applicable to practice. This is due to prac-
tical limitations imposed by decentraliza-
tion and incomplete information – the
two aspects discussed in Sect. 3.2. Some
authors acknowledge this and suggest
heuristic approaches that satisfy more
realistic but still not generally feasible
conditions. The simulation results docu-
mented in Sect. 5 emphasize the need to
fill this research gap.
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4 The Simulation Approach
As the success of revenue management is
difficult to measure due to such factors
as changes in demand, competition, mar-
keting campaigns and special offers, the
computational study presented here re-
lies on a simulation approach. By ana-
lyzing multiple simulation scenarios, we
establish benchmarks for the cost of de-
centralized codeshare revenue manage-
ment under conditions of incomplete
information.
4.1 The REMATE Simulation
Environment
As described in Frank et al. (2008,
pp. 7–16), simulation experiments are
frequently used to evaluate the success of
revenue management approaches. Sim-
ulations allow for ceteris paribus mar-
ket conditions when comparing various
strategies. Such an evaluation is not fea-
sible in the real world, where changes in
economic factors and competitor strategy
may lead to diverging outcomes.
We use a web-based simulation sys-
tem called REMATE which was devel-
oped by Lufthansa and several cooperat-
ing universities in 2009 (Cleophas 2012,
pp. 163–170). REMATE is based on the
recommendations for revenue manage-
ment simulations listed in Frank et al.
(2008, pp. 7–16) and implemented us-
ing Java. The affiliated universities use
REMATE for application-driven theoret-
ical research; at Lufthansa, the system
supports strategic decisions and training.
4.2 Modeling Customers, Airlines and
Revenue Management
The simulation model implemented in
REMATE combines discrete-event-based
and agent-based modeling: Airlines and
customers are represented by agents, ac-
quiring information from their environ-
ment and manipulating it through their
decisions. Each action is scheduled as an
event and realized sequentially. Stochas-
tic elements include the variation of de-
mand volume and customer characteris-
tics.
Our customer model contains six cus-
tomer types with varying sensitivity to
prices and products. For the sake of
simplicity, there are no cancellations,
re-bookings nor repeated requests. The
demand volume is given by a demand-to-
capacity ratio. The local or intraline de-
mand of a carrier includes all requests
Fig. 2 Network with one hub and 12 spokes served by two airlines
for routes exclusively served by that car-
rier. Requests for routes served jointly by
both carriers are referred to as codeshare
demand.
The airlines in this study operate dis-
tinct network revenue management sys-
tems, assume independent demand (Tal-
luri and van Ryzin 2004, pp. 301–303)
and use perfect forecasts as basis for rev-
enue maximization. Optimization is re-
alized through the Dynamic Program-
ming Decomposition described in Talluri
and van Ryzin (2004, p. 107), resulting
in bid price controls. The available of-
fers are displayed in a GDS, where cus-
tomers book tickets. Based on the ob-
served bookings, the airlines update their
control decisions repeatedly during the
booking period.
In the case of alliances, the airlines fol-
low the setup described in Sect. 3.2: They
operate distinct RM systems, do not ex-
plicitly forecast and optimize the code-
share itineraries, and use AVS to con-
trol the codeshare booking process. AVS
information is exchanged each time a
booking request arrives. The revenue of
codeshare itineraries is shared based on
the relative length of the individual flights
(mileage proration).
4.3 Simulation Scenarios Implemented
The scenarios implemented for the com-
putational study aim to be sufficiently
small to provide traceable effects but real-
istic enough to generate meaningful find-
ings. To this end, they model actual net-
work constellations and were calibrated
by means of Lufthansa booking data.
All scenarios contain 12 flights – four
long-haul and eight short-haul flights. In
the monopoly scenario, all flights are op-
erated by a single airline; in the code-
share scenarios, two airlines operate half
the flights each, as depicted in Fig. 2. The
two sub-networks are symmetric and do
not overlap, i.e., the distances between
the hub and the spokes are the same, and
spoke airports are served by exactly one
airline. In its local network, each airline
sells 15 intraline itineraries; 18 additional
codeshare itineraries are created when
the two networks are connected. Both
carriers market all codeshare itineraries.
A capacity of 400 and 200 seats respec-
tively per long-haul and short-haul flight
is divided into two compartments (80 %
Economy, 20 % Business). The busi-
ness compartment includes three book-
ing classes; the economy compartment
includes eight booking classes. Each class
has unique product restrictions. Prices
are based on the distance flown and a
class specific multiplier derived through
regression over Lufthansa fare structures.
The prices on complementary codeshare
routes are the same for each airline.
For this study, five different supply sce-
narios are combined with seven demand
clusters. Each scenario includes two air-
lines in different codeshare situations: In
three scenarios, the carriers offer comple-
mentary codeshares created by connect-
ing the two sub-networks in Fig. 2. Each
incoming flight of one airline connects to
every outgoing flight of the other airline.
The results are compared to the optimal
solution determined by monopolistically
optimizing all flights and itineraries.
The first three scenarios differ by the
distribution of demand between airlines.
In scenario S demand is symmetric: The
demand-to-capacity ratio as well as the
traffic mix – the proportion of codeshare
to local demand – is the same for every
airline. In the other two scenarios, AS1
and AS2, the demand is asymmetric: In
AS1, one carrier offers 25 % less capac-
ity, but the demand remains unchanged.
Hence, the share of codeshare demand
is equal, but the demand-to-capacity ra-
tio for this carrier is one third higher
than that observed by the other carrier.
In AS2, one carrier’s capacity and lo-
cal demand (but not the codeshare de-
mand) are reduced by 25 %. As a result,
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Table 1 Overview of scenarios
Scenario Type of codeshare Demand-to-capacity ratio Traffic mix
S Complementary Symmetric Symmetric
AS1 Complementary Asymmetric Symmetric
AS2 Complementary Symmetric Asymmetric
V25 Virtual Symmetric Symmetric
V50 Virtual Symmetric Symmetric
Table 2 Overview of demand clusters
Demand cluster Demand-to-capacity ratio Share of business demand Willingness-to-pay
1 Low (1.22) Very high (25 %) High (9.64)
2 Medium (1.31) High (22 %) High (9.17)
3 Medium (1.35) Medium (20 %) Medium (8.38)
4 High (1.46) Medium (19 %) Medium (7.75)
5 Very high (1.58) Very low (14 %) Low (7.24)
6 Very high (1.62) Medium (20 %) Medium (8.38)
7 Very low (1.13) Medium (20 %) Medium (8.38)
the demand-to-capacity ratio for the lo-
cal demand is the same, but the smaller
carrier’s share of codeshare passengers is
higher.
Two further scenarios (V25 and V50)
simulate virtual codesharing. We in-
troduce a second, virtual airline to
the monopoly scenario, which sells all
itineraries without operating any flights.
Note that in case of proper availability
exchange and common product restric-
tions and prices, the marketing airline’s
offers would not deviate from the oper-
ating carrier’s offers. However, in prac-
tice, this is usually not the case: First,
the availability exchange method may not
be consistent with the local availability
control method of the respective carrier.
Second, the marketing airline frequently
offers different product restrictions or
lower fares.
To simulate the cost of virtual code-
sharing, we use AVS for codeshare con-
trol, while implementing bid price con-
trols in the carriers’ local networks.
Therefore the availabilities determined by
the operating and the marketing carrier
are likely to deviate. Furthermore, we re-
duce the fares of the virtual airline by
two discount levels calculated in percent
of the difference between two subsequent
fares of the operating carrier. We copy ev-
ery booking class of the operating car-
rier and subtract the discount between
the price of this class and the next cheaper
class. In V25, the discount percentage is
25 %; in V50 it is 50 %. The scenarios are
summarized in Table 1.
The seven demand clusters differ in the
demand-to-capacity ratio and in the dis-
tribution of demand across the customer
types, inducing differences in the overall
willingness-to-pay. Clusters 1 to 5 corre-
spond to five typical demand situations
on intercontinental routes as observed in
the Lufthansa network. In all five clus-
ters, demand exceeds capacity (ratios be-
tween 1.2 and 1.6), but the customer mix
varies from high value business to high
volume leisure. Clusters 6 and 7 present
the same customer mix as Cluster 3 with
an alteration of +/−20 % total demand,
resulting in relatively high (Cluster 6) and
low (Cluster 7) demand-to-capacity ra-
tios. The share of codeshare demand is
30 % across all scenarios and clusters
except for the small carrier in AS2, for
which the share increases to 40 %. An
overview of the seven clusters is provided
in Table 2. Note that the willingness-to-
pay factor needs to be multiplied with the
square root of the distance of a specific
itinerary in order to obtain the average
willingness-to-pay on that itinerary.
5 Computational Study:
Quantifying the Alliance Effect
This section presents the results of the
simulation study outlined in the previous
section. Each scenario is executed over
Table 3 Bookings and revenue with-
out codesharing in scenario S
Bookings Revenue
Cluster 1 76.83 % 66.82 %
Cluster 2 80.49 % 66.32 %
Cluster 3 81.52 % 66.21 %
Cluster 4 90.34 % 68.24 %
Cluster 5 92.55 % 68.70 %
Cluster 6 92.18 % 69.06 %
Cluster 7 68.66 % 66.82 %
100 runs; the final results are the average
over all runs with 95 % confidence.
5.1 Market Extension through
Complementing Codeshares
By means of codesharing complemen-
tary flights, carriers can access new mar-
kets and thus cater for 30 % of network-
wide demand. Table 3 depicts the ag-
gregate revenue and bookings in Sce-
nario S without the codeshare routes to
show the market extension benefit. The
results are stated as percentages of the
monopoly outcome that a single airline is
able to achieve across the entire network
including codeshare demand.
Revenue in all clusters is about one
third lower than the potential maxi-
mum, indicating that the carriers can-
not compensate for revenue losses by lo-
cal demand. In fact, they are losing even
more revenue than demand, suggesting
that codeshare demand is more valu-
able. In terms of bookings, we find that
in Clusters 1 and 7 with low and very
low demand-to-capacity ratios, the lost
bookings correspond to the reduction in
demand. In clusters with relatively high
demand-to-capacity ratios, the majority
of bookings can be compensated by local
demand.
Symmetric Demand The impact of de-
centralized codeshare control with AVS
under symmetric demand is shown in
Fig. 3. As in the subsequent analyses,
bookings and revenue are presented as
bars illustrating the percentage change
compared to monopolistic controls.
Bookings decrease slightly in four of
seven clusters and significantly decrease
by up to 0.7 % in the high demand
Clusters 5 and 6. Only in Cluster 7 we
see a small increase. Overall, codeshar-
ing has no strong impact on the resulting
bookings.
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Fig. 3 Cost of
complementary
codesharing – scenario S
Fig. 4 Cost of
complementary
codesharing – scenario AS1
With regard to revenue, we observe
a drop across all clusters compared to
the monopoly situation. The effect varies
from −0.23 to −0.98 %, with the great-
est losses occurring in clusters 5 and 6
(high demand-to-capacity ratios). This
result can be attributed to the ineffi-
ciencies of AVS described in Sect. 3.2
as well as to effects of separate forecast-
ing and optimization. Both aspects cause
the availabilities to differ from the mo-
nopolistic optimum and thereby lead to
sub-optimal control decisions.
As argued in Chap. 2, codesharing
enables airlines to exploit new passen-
ger streams. However, as capacity is re-
stricted, displacement costs arise and new
codeshare routes can harm the passen-
ger flow on intraline itineraries. To an-
alyze this, Fig. 3 displays two lines pre-
senting the revenue gap on codeshare and
intraline itineraries respectively. We find
that, except for Cluster 7, the impact on
intraline itineraries is distinctly stronger.
While the effect is ambiguous on code-
share itineraries – on average the per-
formance is about the same as in the
monopoly case – it is always negative
on intraline itineraries. This can be ex-
plained by each airline forecasting and
optimizing codeshare bookings on the lo-
cal intraline itineraries. As a result, the
intraline forecasts increase and revenue
management controls become overly re-
strictive, leading to fewer bookings and
less revenue.
Asymmetric Demand Since, so far, de-
mand for both airlines was symmetric,
both carriers had 50 % market share
and the losses were distributed equally.
In contrast, this section considers two
scenarios with deviating demand situa-
tions. In AS1, the capacity of one car-
rier is reduced by 25 %, reducing over-
all capacity by 12.5 %, while demand re-
mains constant. Thus, the carrier with
the smaller capacity faces excess de-
mand and its demand-to-capacity ratio
increases to up to 2.4. The results com-
pared to the monopoly situation with the
same demand and capacity pattern are
depicted in Fig. 4.
In AS2, we also reduce the local de-
mand for the smaller carrier, leaving
the codeshare demand unchanged. Con-
sequently, the share of codeshare de-
mand increases. The results are depicted
in Fig. 5. Note that for both scenarios,
we also display the change in individ-
ual carriers’ revenue. To this end, results
are compared to the monopoly results
achieved exclusively from the flights as-
signed to this carrier. The revenue from
multi-leg itineraries is prorated based on
the relatively flown mileage.
First of all, we can note that in AS1
and AS2 the change in bookings is again
rather small. Across both scenarios as
well as all clusters, we find a consistent
decrease of around −0.5 % in the total
bookings (varying between −0.02 % to
−0.88 %).
In terms of revenue, the effect is strictly
negative, and with the exception of Clus-
ter 7, the resulting losses are generally
higher than in the symmetric case. This
can be explained by the higher demand-
to-capacity ratios: In line with our ob-
servation in S, the higher the demand-
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Fig. 5 Cost of
complementary
codesharing – scenario AS2
Fig. 6 Cost of virtual
codesharing – scenario V25
to-capacity ratio, the higher the losses
caused by inefficient codeshare revenue
management. In AS1, the revenue gap
amounts to −0.5 % to −3.34 %. In AS2,
the revenue gap is smaller than in AS1, as
the demand is lower. Yet it is still larger
than in S, due to the incremental code-
share demand. It varies between −0.17 %
and −2.13 %.
The performance of the individual car-
riers holds greater interest. As can be seen
from the two lines for the small and the
large carrier, the one with the reduced
capacity consistently suffers higher rev-
enue losses. In AS1, these amount to up
to −6 %. In AS2, they approach −4.5 %.
The performance of the carrier with reg-
ular capacity in AS1 is only slightly worse
than in S, while in AS2, the losses are
about the same, and sometimes even
small gains occur.
In both cases, the highest losses oc-
cur in the clusters including many high
value passengers. First, in AS1, there is
generally more demand and therefore in-
efficient codeshare revenue management
incurs a higher risk: Suboptimal code-
share control is more likely to displace
high value passengers. Second, in AS2,
while the overall demand is not much
higher, the larger share of codeshare de-
mand increases the impact of subopti-
mal acceptance decision taken by AVS.
As critical decisions are more likely when
codeshare demand is high, the probabil-
ity to displace high value demand also
increases.
5.2 The Cost of Virtual Codeshares
This section analyzes how virtual code-
sharing affects the performance of the al-
liance. We introduce a virtual airline that
does not operate flights and solely mar-
kets the other carrier’s itineraries. The
fares of the virtual airline undercut those
offered by the operating carrier by 25 %
of the difference to the next cheaper
booking class in V25 and by 50 % in V50.
In the monopoly scenario, a single carrier
controls all classes, both the 11 original
ones and the 11 discounted classes. The
respective results are presented in Figs. 6
and 7.
We find that introducing an addi-
tional marketing carrier with lower fares
slightly increases the number of book-
ings in most clusters, particularly in
those with low and medium demand-to-
capacity ratios. Once more, the change in
bookings is relatively small compared to
the effect on revenue: The latter is con-
sistently negative across both scenarios
and all seven clusters. Given the mod-
erate discount of 25 %, the effect varies
between −0.14 % and −0.68 %. With
the higher discount, the effect becomes
more pronounced and revenue declines
by between −0.51 % and −1.44 %.
The losses can be explained by the
monopoly airline jointly controlling the
regular and the discounted booking
classes. Thus it has full control over
all offers, while in the codeshare case
it cannot directly control the availabil-
ity of the virtual codeshare classes. In-
stead, their availability is determined by
the sum of the AVS availabilities on the
respective flights. On the one hand, this
tends to be more restrictive. On the
other hand, virtual classes that become
available underbid the regular offers and
customers buy the lower fare, causing
revenue losses.
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Fig. 7 Cost of virtual
codesharing – scenario V50
6 Concluding Remarks
The contribution of this paper is twofold.
On the one hand, we cluster the bene-
fits of airline alliances into three groups
of marketing promises and examine the
impact of codesharing on each step of
the airline planning process. The former
constitutes codeshare alliances as mar-
keting tool. The latter serves as guide-
line to researchers as well as practitioners
on how to implement codeshare alliances
throughout the planning process.
On the other hand, we quantify the ef-
fect of decentralized booking control in
three typical codeshare situations. Our
model uses separate revenue manage-
ment systems and assumes limited infor-
mation exchange, as currently applied in
the industry. We find significant losses
due to suboptimal booking control. They
are the result of the information asym-
metry (moral hazard) among the alliance
partners: Only the marketing carrier has
full information about the request and
makes the acceptance decision on behalf
of the operating carrier. In addition, nei-
ther carrier can verify whether the part-
ners act in their mutual best interest. The
operating carrier cannot control the mar-
keting carrier’s decision, while the mar-
keting carrier cannot observe the cor-
rectness of the availabilities provided by
the operating carrier. In the economics
literature, this situation is described by
the principal-agent problem. As the rev-
enue gap between the alliance and the
monopoly turns out to be significant in
our simulations, it is in the interest of all
members to implement mechanisms that
align the alliance decisions. In Sect. 6.1,
we continue this discussion and derive
four managerial implications from our
findings.
6.1 Managerial Implications
First, we found that in the symmetric sce-
nario, revenue losses are not limited to
codeshare routes, but propagate through
the whole network, also affecting intra-
line itineraries. In fact, our results clearly
indicate that with the given revenue man-
agement setup, intraline itineraries bear
the most severe losses. This can be at-
tributed to skewed local forecasts and to
suboptimal codeshare controls displac-
ing more valuable local passengers. This
observation supports the need for sepa-
rate codeshare forecasting and optimiza-
tion. Also, management needs to con-
sider these effects when evaluating the
performance of the alliance or that of
individual routes.
Second, our results show that airlines
with higher demand on intraline routes
or a higher share of codeshare demand
face an increased risk from suboptimal
codeshare management. Given an in-
crease of about one third, the respective
carrier loses an additional 2 % to 3.5 % of
its revenue. Hence, this carrier’s manage-
ment needs to be more restrictive when
picking partners and routes for codeshar-
ing. Furthermore, as a carrier in this sit-
uation faces a higher risk, it may want
to negotiate an incentive scheme guar-
anteeing a larger share of the resulting
revenue.
Third, we observed that virtual code-
sharing with underbidding causes rev-
enue losses of up to 1.5 % (depending
on the discount level) when compared to
the case of monopoly. This indicates that
it is better for an airline to control all
its offers singlehandedly. Consequently,
partners and routes for virtual codeshar-
ing should be chosen with care; a regu-
lar evaluation of the marketing benefits
from the additional sales channel in re-
lation to the loss of control seems highly
recommendable. In this context, aspects
of trust and financial dependency are par-
ticularly important: Close partners or fi-
nancially dependent carriers may have
fewer incentives to underbid or harm
their allies.
Last, we observe that across all sce-
narios, the volume of bookings is lit-
tle affected by codesharing. Changes in
revenue are explained by shifts in the
distribution of bookings across booking
classes. Furthermore, losses in revenue
usually exceed the change in bookings,
thereby reducing the yield and suggest-
ing that primarily high value bookings
are affected.
6.2 Summary and Outlook
In this paper, we analyzed the impact of
airline codeshare alliances under two as-
pects: We contrasted the promises from
a marketing perspective with the chal-
lenges arising for airline planning sup-
ported by information systems. Focus-
ing on revenue management systems as
the area in which the contrast between
the two aspects is clearest, we quantified
the effect of decentralized codeshare con-
trol using stochastic simulations. Finally,
we highlighted four managerial recom-
mendations for codeshare revenue man-
agement as taken from the simulation
results.
The findings established in Sect. 5 are
based on large-scale stochastic simula-
tions and were validated across seven typ-
ical demand constellations. The scenarios
cover several connecting flights, different
traffic flows, and realistic price and prod-
uct structures. Possible extensions could
include a closed-loop revenue manage-
ment model with adaptive forecasts, the
integration of competition, and the com-
parison of alternative RM approaches.
The first two points were neglected as
we expected a distortion of the effects of
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The paper juxtaposes the challenges
that airline codeshare alliances cre-
ate for analytical information systems
on the one hand and their motivation
from a marketing perspective on the
other. The authors review the state-of-
the-art literature on potential market-
ing benefits and analyze the impact on
airline planning systems. In this regard,
revenue management systems are of
particular interest. Based on a simula-
tion study, the authors infer a severe
impact of decentralized codeshare con-
trols as currently widely implemented
in the industry on revenue manage-
ment performance. In the scenarios ex-
amined, complementary codesharing
reduces alliance-wide revenues by up
to 1 %. Losses increase when a car-
rier experiences high local demand or a
high degree of codeshare demand, and
disseminate over the whole network.
Virtual codeshares also cause losses
of 0.3 % to 1.5 % depending on the
discount level offered by the market-
ing carrier and on the demand struc-
ture. Finally, the authors formulate a set
of managerial implications based on
these findings.
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Codesharing, Simulation, Marketing
codesharing: The performance of the al-
liance might be influenced by the quality
of the forecast as well as by the decisions
of the competitor. Nevertheless, both as-
pects and in particular the comparison
of alternative RM systems provide op-
portunities for ongoing research. Possi-
ble variations may include protection lev-
els for availability control as well as fore-
cast and optimization algorithms assum-
ing dependent demand or incorporating
customer choice behavior.
We also note that our model is mo-
tivated by current industry practice. As
mentioned in Sect. 3.3, recent research
has introduced a number of theoreti-
cal advances. Implementing these fea-
tures would most likely reduce the ob-
served effects. However, the intention of
this paper is to highlight the necessity to
close the gap between the new, theoretical
approaches and the application-driven
implementations observed in practice.
Further research may extend our work
in several ways. First of all, we have not
considered parallel codeshares as a mar-
keting tool and therefore have not in-
cluded them in our investigation. A sim-
ilar study could be conducted to de-
termine the cost of suboptimal parallel
codesharing.
The impact of codeshare alliances may
be further studied in context of in-
novative pricing and revenue manage-
ment approaches. For example, Post and
Spann (2012, pp. 329–338) provide an
analysis of variable opaque products on
the airline market. Codesharing can be
seen as a variant of opaque products, as
the customer may not directly observe
which alliance carrier operates the flight,
and the service level may vary between
consecutive flights.
In view of our results, alternative ap-
proaches to codeshare revenue manage-
ment may attempt to minimize the ef-
fect on the individual partners and routes
and could be evaluated based on the cri-
teria in this article. Additionally, incen-
tive schemes could base their allocation
decisions on the market environment to
compensate for the different risks that the
partners face. Similar schemes may also
be used to govern virtual codeshares and
to avoid underbidding.
Finally, although we pointed out that
pricing and revenue management pose
the greatest challenges, other areas of
planning and operations should not be
neglected. Especially joint airport re-
source planning as well as joint oper-
ations control provide new opportuni-
ties for future research and should be
systematically considered.
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